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ABSTRACT  
Background: The espoused rationale for this special issue, situated “at the margins of cy-
bernetics,” was to revisit and extend the common genealogy of cybernetics and communica-
tion studies. Two possible topics garnered our attention: 1) the history of intellectual
adventurers whose work has appropriated cybernetic concepts; and 2) the remediation of cy-
bernetic metaphors. 
Analysis:  A heuristic for engaging in ﬁrst- and second-order R&D praxis, the design of which
was informed by co-research with pastoralists (1989–1993) and the authors’ engagements
with the scholarship of Bateson and Maturana, was employed and adapted as a reﬂexive in-
quiry framework. 
Conclusion and implications:  This inquiry challenges the mainstream desire for change
and the belief in getting the communication right in order to achieve change. The authors
argue this view is based on an epistemological error that continues to produce the very prob-
lems it intends to diminish, and thus we live a fundamental error in epistemology, false on-
tology, and misplaced practice. The authors offer instead conceptual and praxis possibilities
for triggering new co-evolutionary trajectories.
Keywords:  Reﬂexive praxis; Experience; Distinctions; Critical incidents; Maturana
RÉSUMÉ 
Contexte  La raison d’être de ce numéro spécial « aux marges de la cybernétique » était de
revisiter et d’étoffer la généalogie partagée de la cybernétique et des études en
communication. Deux sujets possibles ont retenu notre attention : 1) l’histoire d’explorateurs
intellectuels qui ont emprunté certains concepts à la cybernétique; et 2) la rectiﬁcation de
métaphores cybernétiques.
Analyse  Comme cadre d’enquête réﬂexive, les auteurs ont adopté et adapté une heuristique
fondée sur des praxis de recherche de premier et de second ordre. La conception de cette
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démarche a été nourrie par une recherche entreprise avec des éleveurs en milieu pastoral (1989-
1893) ainsi que par leur propre investissement dans les travaux de Bateson et de Maturana
Conclusion et implications  Cette enquête remet en question le désir conventionnel du
changement et la croyance qu’il sufﬁt de bien communiquer pour produire ce changement.
Les auteurs soutiennent que ce point de vue se fonde sur une erreur épistémologique qui
engendre les problèmes mêmes qu’elle cherche à résoudre, perpétuant ainsi une erreur
fondamentale en épistémologie, une fausse ontologie et une pratique déplacée. A la place, les
auteurs suggèrent des voies conceptuelles et pratiques permettant de promouvoir de
nouvelles trajectoires de coévolution.
Mots clés  Pratique réﬂexive; Expérience; Distinctions; Incidents critiques; Maturana
Setting the stage—conceptual
If innovation as well as social and personal change could be achieved by “effective”
communication and the ready availability of knowledge, the world operating under
the current mindset would be a great place to live. There would be ready at hand the
vehicle, the wherewithal, to deliver on sound planning and intervention for the
achievement of positive change. The desire for change and the belief in getting the
communication “right,” in order to achieve the nominated change, is pervasive in our
society. Our experiences and rejection of this pervasive desire—particularly in the
ﬁelds of psychotherapy, agriculture and rural development, higher education, and en-
vironmental governance—together with our history of engagement with cyber-sys-
temic scholarship and praxis inform this article (see Ison, 2016; Ison & Russell, 2011;
Ison & Schlindwein, 2015; Ison & Shelley, 2016).1 For us, the problem is that this desire
is based on an epistemological error that continues to produce the very problems that
it intends to diminish. We address the fundamental error in epistemology, false ontol-
ogy, and misplaced practice that lie at the base of this mindset.
Gregory Bateson (1991) asserted that the word “cybernetics” had become seriously
corrupted following its initial introduction by the French physicist and mathematician
André-Marie Ampère in his 1834 essay “Essi sur la philosophie” (see Tsien, 1954).
Ampère used the word to describe the science of civil government. It was adopted and
placed in circulation by Norbert Wiener in his 1948 book Cybernetics. Arguably it would
have been more conducive to a broader inquiry had the word “cybernetics” not been
settled on: from today’s perspective, of the many affordances of the term “cybernetics,”
the focus has become images of mechanism that are inadequate for what is a theory
and practice of the very underpinnings of animal, human, and mechanical engage-
ment. Having made this claim, we are immediately in the realm of metaphor theory,2
particularly concerns with the revealing and concealing features of a metaphor as well
as particular theoretical entailments (Ison, Allan, & Collins, 2015; McClintock, Ison, &
Armson, 2004).
A science of ﬂow, whether it be in the cosmos, in nervous systems, or in machines,
but especially in the organization of living, might have been more in keeping with
what actually happens. That said, a ﬂow metaphor reveals for some the “beingness”
associated with immersion in the game, or dance, but conceals usage associated with
rivers, lava, and the like, which are essentially linear of the form: ﬂow from A to B. The
choice of a metaphor when talking about communication or mental matters as aspects
of social relations is of critical importance if a false epistemology is to be avoided. If
the metaphor is based on spatial or mechanical imagery, then subsequent thinking
inevitably is led away from relationships and toward the materialization of mental or
conversational phenomena. Too many contemporary metaphors conceal (or fail to re-
veal) relational dynamics such as those associated with co-evolutionary processes
(Ison, 2016; Norgaard, 1994).
The word “cybernetics,” in its original Greek usage, was associated with the act of
steering, a practice, but came to encompass governance:3 all that is pertinent to inter-
action of human to human and humans to machines, the conservation of networks,
and patterns that interact with other patterns. The choice of the term to convey the
sense of governance and an executive function must have been partially determined
by the settings of the time. The advent of the industrial era, the mechanization of the
labour market worked to shape the thinking of the hundred-year period from Ampère
to Wiener, 1834 to 1948. Cyber as a preﬁx and a descriptor has assumed the role of or-
ganizing metaphor, a role often adopted outside of awareness and with consequences
that express nothing less than the tide of the times. On the other hand, interactive in-
terpretation of the image of a woman sailing (steering) a boat can reveal:
through the agency of a helmswoman the operation or “integration”•
of both social (interpretations of purpose) and biophysical (wind, cur-
rents) feedback processes
how the act of sailing arises in relational terms in which the social-bio-•
physical relationship is mediated by technology (a boat with certain
design features) or institutions (e.g., the rules of a sailing race)
that sailing is always socially embedded, and mostly done with others•
(e.g., where there is a crew it involves co-building and enacting an ef-
fective “sailing performance”)
Explored in this way, the revealing features of the cybernetic metaphor as the un-
folding acts of governing (i.e., steering) far exceed those associated with a ﬁrst-order cy-
bernetic concern with governing of, or in, a machine, as in a steam engine or through
actions of a thermostat in a heating/cooling system. The sailing metaphor speaks to the
constraints, observed by Medina (2011), in the design and enactment of Chile’s Project
Cybersyn experiment fostered by President Salvador Allende. Put another way, for us
the “steerer steering” is always part of the system; thus, our account could be described
as a second-order cybernetic understanding of the metaphor (von  Foerster, 1992).
Unpacking Bateson’s epistemology is fraught when restricted to the use of words
in communicative interactions that begin the process of conserving lineages of usage,
interpretation, and understanding. For example, Wiener (1950) in his next book, The
Human Use of Human Beings, wrote as if he were addressing the interpretation that his
earlier text had been dehumanizing, emphasizing the potential productive communi-
cation implied by human and machine co-operation. Looking at the text with the ben-
eﬁt of hindsight, one sees that his thesis was governed by directional and control
imagery. Here is his summary: “It is the thesis of this book that society can only be un-
derstood through a study of the messages and the communication facilities which be-
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long to it; and that in the future development of these messages between man and ma-
chines, between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are [sic] des-
tined to play an ever-increasing part” (p.  16, emphasis added). Wiener’s overarching
value/metaphor was conveyed in his deﬁnition of the message as “a sequence of events
in time which, though in itself has certain contingency, strives to hold back nature’s
tendency towards disorder by adjusting its parts to various purposive ends” (p.  27). This
acting with a purpose, intention, or design, which is rigidly predetermined, is at the
heart of this article’s thesis. These initial starting conditions created the pathway de-
pendencies that have tended to be conserved ever since, at least within the dominant
ﬁrst-order cybernetic tradition which is also that of popular culture.
The core problem for Bateson, and the one we inherited as researchers and prac-
titioners in our various domains, was the association of cybernetics with 1)  control
and 2)  messaging as the effective transfer of “information.” It became important to
argue that to redeem Bateson’s conception, emphasis needed to be put on the re-
cursive nature of a circulating system and, in the case of any living or social system,
the unit had to be the living organism and its environment. In this reframing, what
drives “the system” is the emotion, the “fundamental, sensory, operational and re-
lational condition  … that makes possible our human living” (Maturana, Dávila
Yáñez, & Ramírez Muñoz, 2015). What emerged from Wiener’s neologizing can be
understood as the conservation of two lineages, traditions of understanding (Russell
& Ison, 2000a) that began to be conserved in different practices, including commu-
nication practices.4
In the early 1950s, Gregory Bateson was a major protagonist in espousing a radical
epistemology, one that questioned the long-standing acceptance, the taken-for-granted-
ness, of a mind-less biology, psychology, and all other domains of knowing. Bateson’s
“mind” was the foundational construct of all knowing and was essentially a doing ac-
tivity, a verb, a mind-making phenomenon. The past 60  years have been a testimony
to just how difﬁcult it is to follow through, in practice, with the application of his epis-
temology. Research experience shows how seductive it is to fall, almost unknowingly,
into attributing a thing-ness quality to experience. What humans do well is the creation
of objects that are then endowed with characteristics. As Bateson himself would say,
we are drawn to the dream of “the idea of power,” the sense of “control,” that we as-
sume will deliver that which we desire (as researchers, academics, practitioners in the
clinic and the ﬁeld). From our experience, the seduction of “power” in this sense ap-
plies across the social and biophysical sciences. It even applies to many conceptions
of “power.” A common trap is when what might be sensed as power fails to be explored
and reframed as a phenomenon of relationship, particularly where there is institutional
or technological failure to mediate/create and sustain relationships having certain qual-
ities (e.g., the difﬁculty today of safely creating the experience of swimming in fresh
water for a child). 
Setting the stage—personal
Collectively or individually the authors, for the past 30  years, have been struggling
with extending cybernetic thinking, systems thinking (i.e., cyber-systemic thinking),
and the “embodiments of difference,” the “feeling” of difference/news, into situations
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of uncertainty, complexity in which there is rarely one perspective that is, by itself,
valid to the issue at hand.5 Our practice covers multiple domains with mixed results
in each, but has been more extensive in agricultural and rural R&D, social-biophysical
“system” governance (e.g., river basins or catchments), in psychotherapeutic practice
and in higher education (HE) learning and teaching. Contested understandings of
communication and research lie at the heart of each of these situations of concern, or
domains, an issue still prevalent in communication research. As Fabien Granjon (2014)
wrote, “Outside France, the classical diffusionist, functionalist, and quantitative orien-
tations continue to mark a great deal of the research undertaken…” (p.  117).
The notions of “struggle” and “mixed results” underscore just how challenging
it has been to be true to Bateson’s dictum that what gets from the territory onto the
map is news of difference and nothing else (G. Bateson, 1991).6 The research questions
that have preoccupied the authors since the mid-1980s are as follows:
What would have to be experienced to claim an experience of•
Bateson’s epistemology as praxis?
What trajectory-shifting actions might be undertaken to begin to con-•
serve a Batesonian epistemology as a particular manner of living?
How might Bateson’s epistemology be institutionalized such that it•
gives rise to governance performances (within a co-evolutionary dy-
namic between the social and biophysical “worlds”) that begin to be
conserved?
Does the study of regulatory processes imply acting with intention or•
predetermined design?
Do circular processes and systems thinking (i.e., cyber-systemics) nec-•
essarily imply predetermined goals?
What does, or could, acting purposefully (innovatively, designerly, en-•
trepreneurially, ethically, systemically) within a Batesonian epistemol-
ogy entail?
Beginning in 1986, like many others in applied research, we cut our teeth on a cri-
tique of the dominant practice, in our case the extension of laboratory/ﬁeld research
offered to the end-users (agricultural producers) within a model of agricultural re-
search and extension that had become widespread (Russell, Ison, Gamble, & Williams,
1989). We found inherent epistemological contradiction in the model of communica-
tion/extension in use and proposed a conversational model as an alternative, and log-
ically consistent, practice (and which better resonated as being more useful with our
constituency, the agricultural producers). This initial work led to a major applied re-
search program, the Community Approaches to Rangeland Research (CARR) project
(1989–1993), working with pastoralists in semi-arid Australia, in which a radically dif-
ferent model of doing R&D was tested (Ison & Russell, 2000a).7
At the heart of our work is the experience of knowing as coming to know, the
emotional drive underlying this process, and the practical veriﬁcation of this episte-
mology in its use. The two-stage process of bodily experience (outside of awareness)
and then the act of reﬂecting on that experience, or on some of it at least, Bateson’s
“idea” as the feeling/news of difference, was and is our unifying understanding. Our
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reﬂexive journey offers insights for contemporary concerns including transdisciplinar-
ity, second-order science, institutional innovation, and what might be gained from in-
vesting in cyber-systemic praxis from the margins.
Methodological approach
Just as the artist Paul Klee saw drawing as a way of taking a line for a walk, the authors,
by attending to the actual interaction, doing our best not to abstract from experience,
will attempt to take the reader for a languorous stroll through the ups and downs of
some of our major projects from 1986 till the present. Understandably, there is only scope
for a few stops along the way. To do this we begin with reprising and reviewing one of
the major outputs of the CARR project undertaken primarily with pastoralists in semi-
arid Australia (Appendix). The design and rationale and outcomes of this research are
reported in Russell and Ison (1993) and Ison and Russell (2000a; 2007). The table in the
Appendix reports a four-stage strategy as a template for guiding the design of a second-
order R&D system. This design and our testing of it drew heavily on Maturana’s and
Bateson’s epistemologies (see Russell & Ison, 2000a, 2000b; Ison & Russell 2000b). This
framework, when developed, offered a formal and complete second-order R&D proce-
dure in which transparency and openness to public scrutiny could be achieved.
Working contemporaneously with, but without mutual awareness of, Gibbons,
Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, and Trow (1994), who distinguished Mode  1
and Mode  2 forms of knowledge production, we distinguished second-order and ﬁrst-
order R&D. To us, the latter was the mainstream approach, in which the researcher re-
mains outside “the system” being studied:
The espoused stance by researchers is that of objectivity and while the sys-
tem being studied is often spoken of in open system terms, intervention
is performed as though it were a closed system. Perception and action by
researchers and those who manage and maintain the R&D system are
based on a belief in a real world; a world of discrete entities that have
meaning in and of themselves. (Russell & Ison, 2000a, p.  10)
Our concern was to devise a means to break out of the dominant tradition and to in-
vent one which “honoured” the epistemological commitments of Maturana and
Bateson. Thus, in contrast to the ﬁrst-order tradition, we stressed
the need for a second-order R&D in which the espoused role and action
of the researcher is very much part of the interactions being studied. How
the researcher perceives the situation is critical to the system being studied.
Responsibility replaces objectivity as an ethic and perception and action
are based on one’s experiential world rather than on a belief in a single re-
ality “real” world. (Russell & Ison, 2000a, p.  10)
Unlike Gibbons et  al. (1994), we drew explicitly on cyber-systemic understandings,
with an appreciation that ﬁrst-order approaches had at their core a model of commu-
nication based on simple feedback (as in a thermostat) and historically based misun-
derstandings from nerve physiology and mathematical models of signal transfer (Fell
& Russell, 2000). Signal transfer, we argued, should not be confused with human com-
munication, which has a biological basis. Second-order communication we understood
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as arising from a theory of cognition that encompasses language, emotion, perception,
and behaviour. Among human beings, this gives rise to new properties in the commu-
nicating partners, who each have different experiential histories. There are of course
implications in any move toward a second-order R&D, not least of which are the forms
of behaviour and organization that might be required by, and for, a future cadre of “re-
searchers.” This initial collaborative ﬁeldwork built an intellectual and methodological
platform for ongoing but separate work by the authors.
Inquiry pathways and critical incidents
Our purpose in this section is not to reprise the major elements of this earlier research
(e.g., see Ison & Russell, 2011), but to revisit the main outcomes that expressly address
innovations in praxis and to offer critical reﬂections relevant to the concerns of this
special issue. To do this we draw on an adaptation of the methodological approach de-
veloped and explained in Colvin, Blackmore, Chimbuya, Collins, Dent, Goss, et  al.
(2014), who used as a key organizing metaphor an “inquiry pathway” (following
Churchman, 1971). Along our inquiry pathway we braid reﬂexive ﬁrst-person inquiry
(see Reason & Bradbury, 2008) with critical incidents (see Flanagan, 1954) and cyber-
netic concept choice/use associated with our praxis (i.e., the recursive relationship be-
tween practice and theory/explanation). Our inquiry pathway begins with the ﬁrst
major joint project that we undertook, as explicated through the Appendix. We visit
other projects conducted jointly or independently before providing an account of ther-
apeutic praxis as developed and enacted now by David Russell (DBR). Our aspiration
in our methodological approach is to give the reader some feel for what our praxis en-
tails and how it has evolved over time in different domains. Importantly, we have no
blueprint to offer and our account is, by necessity of length, only partial.
The idea of a “critical incident” has been interpreted in several ways. We describe
a critical incident as those experiences of difference that made a difference to our do-
ings. In this regard, an experience that recurs for us is the awareness of difference that
arises when an existing organizing metaphor is unable to coherently organize or syn-
thesize our experience (Russell & Ison, 2000c). For example, in 1990 under the seduc-
tion of a collaborator we used a methodological approach with pastoralists that sought
to gain consensus around a common R&D action. Over time we came to understand
that consensus was a lowest-common-denominator position in which the only carry-
through action was from those who held the consensus position from the start; the
process robbed the other pastoralists of their enthusiasm for action. Having discerned,
through experience, the difference between consensus and accommodation among
differences, thereafter we always sought to hold open the space for exploring and work-
ing with difference. This carried though into later research work when, after often
heated and conﬂictual debate, the idea of a ﬁnal synthesis report for a major European
project was rejected in favour of a heuristically mediated process of valuing and medi-
ating difference that came from the different cultural and disciplinary traditions of the
researchers (Blackmore, Ison, & Jiggins, 2007).
Reflections on praxis
The Appendix table is used as a heuristic for reﬂecting on our praxis and for relating
Russell & Ison Gregory Bateson’s Epistemological Crisis 491
speciﬁc critical incidents (as above). The table is organized to explore: 1) the
“process stages” in our co-research praxis model; 2)  necessary tasks at different
stages understood as ﬁrst- or second-order processes; 3)  the skills required at each
stage, and 4) some potential pitfalls. These ﬁrst four columns can be understood
in terms of method. We  then move up a level of abstraction to offer 5)  critical re-
ﬂection/incidents from David Russell’s praxis (DBR), and 6)  Ray Ison’s praxis (RLI),
respectively. The table concludes with 7)  notes on some contemporary implications.
Detail of the research practices we developed, or employed, in enacting the various
steps in this framework are described in Webber (2000). Only a very partial account
can be given here.
Reviewing praxis 1
Research practices included visits to pastoralist families along particular transects, un-
dertaking semi-structured interviews modiﬁed to trigger stories and enthusiasm; tap-
ing and analysis of interviews to create “rich picture” posters of our ﬁndings, which
were “mirrored back” within a community meeting in a local shearing shed (i.e., we
reported what we had interpreted, thus taking responsibility for our interpretations
and inviting clariﬁcation). This worked—the feedback was that “we understood,” un-
like most people who came from outside their world. For reporting we assisted partic-
ipating pastoralists to reﬂect about their experiences and contribute to the writing
(Dignam & Major, 2000).
We explain some of the emergent conceptual and methodological themes arising
from our reﬂections in the following sections. The table in the Appendix could also
be read as a design heuristic for cyber-systemic praxis at the margins and for conduct-
ing second-order science (see Appendix in Ison & Russell, 2000a).
Our rangelands project was highly successful in that it accomplished targeted ﬁrst-
order objectives (e.g., demographic trends; technology audits—CARR, 1993a; Ison &
Russell, 1993); speciﬁed second-order aspirations (e.g., graziers re-conceptualizing
themselves as R&D professionals and engaging in co-research); and provided the raw
material and emotional climate in which the R&D process itself could be scrutinized
and modiﬁed to better match the multilayered demands of its context. Certain sec-
ond-order aspirations were not achieved—for example, our work with research and
advisory staff from New South Wales (NSW) Agriculture (the state agency responsible
for doing agricultural extension) did not lead to the establishment of a co-researching
community (CARR, 1993b; Ison, 2000).
The praxis described in the Appendix can be compared and contrasted with the
contemporary praxis of DBR: what the practitioner does in doing a psychotherapy of
embodied mind-making.
Reviewing praxis 2
The Queen might well have asked Alice: What do you do when you do what you do?
And thought it a perfectly good question. It is an unusual manner of asking about a
particular practice, but it has the advantage of avoiding principles and/or aspirations
and focusing on experience. The following description indicates what the experience
of psychotherapy praxis might look like as developed by DBR.
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First, there is a meeting of two differing desires (the therapist’s and the client’s).
These constitute a never-emptying melting pot of expectations that need to be ex-
pressed and acknowledged but not necessarily fulﬁlled. Expectations are akin to aspi-
rations; what is expressed is so great, but what actually happens is so little.
It is taken for granted that a client in emotional distress is desirous of relief from
their symptoms. The therapist, in listening attentively to the experience of this distress,
acknowledges its reality for the client. In addition to listening, the therapist asserts a
desire to establish a mutually satisfying relationship, based on mutual satisfaction. To
achieve this, the therapist commits to staying in the ongoing therapeutic conversation
until that time when satisfaction is achieved. To illustrate what this exchange might
feel like, there is no better source than Angela Carter, the magical realism author. Carter
was at her best when she offered an inversion of the romantic reverence accorded to
literature and, by extension, to clinical psychology and so-called evidence-based ther-
apy. Carter, in The Sadeian Woman and the Ideology of Pornography (1979), invited a
partaking in a feminist reading of the Marquis de Sade when she wrote: “We do not
go to bed [or attend a therapy session] in simple pairs: even if we choose not to refer
to them, we still drag there with us the cultural impedimenta of our social class, our
parents’ lives, our bank balances, our sexual and emotional expectations, our unique
biographies—all the bits and pieces of our unique existences” (p.  10).
Second, the process of therapy is a continuous recursive offering of invitations:
invitations to say more verbally and non-verbally, in imagery, in motion, and in
thought. The framing of these invitations needs to be such that they do not constitute
an intervention, which is the more traditional metaphor in use in the literature. An  in-
evitable entailment of an intervention (the sting in the tail) is that it is an imposition,
again in any sensual modality, of the therapist’s experience over that of the client. The
recursive invitation to stay with, to deepen, speciﬁc and detailed experience is analo-
gous to the evolutionary assumption that innovations arise independently of the func-
tions that they serve (Berwick & Chomsky, 2016). Therapeutic change implies that the
antecedent ingredients must in a sense already exist.  Trust in the recursive nature of
the invitation, in the presence of sufﬁcient “ingredients,” and in the emotional (the
neural circuitry of desire) interplay of action and reﬂection constitutes the therapeutic
process. Avoidance of any desire to impose, overtly or covertly, a perspective, a way of
thinking, or a behavioural strategy helps retain the integrity of Bateson’s espoused
epistemology and shuns a power relationship.
Third, to say that conversation and language are what we have and are our means
of meaning making is to claim that the conceptual-intentional interface for thought is
both the thrill and the challenge of being human. From this source come our troubling
experiences and our sense of agency. Harlene Anderson (1997) offers a detailed history
of a conversational approach to therapy that shares common ground with the authors’
attitude and practice. Although the espoused praxis is primarily phenomenological,
it is not at odds with current ﬁndings in the ﬁeld of neuroscience and developmental
psychology (e.g., see Marc Lewis’ Biology of Desire, 2015).
Fourth, a strategy of action need not be an intervention. Classical psychotherapy
(stemming mainly from Freud and Jung) proposed a goal of improvement conceptu-
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alized as a reduction in symptoms or the achievement of wholeness. In contrast this
model refrains from stating goals as it follows the understanding that any formulation
of preconceived and desirable outcomes tends to limit the therapeutic process and re-
sult in an objectiﬁcation of a desired experience.
The intention/purpose is to stay with the psychological phenomena, as they are
experienced, including the distressing symptoms, and to de-literalize all formulations
of purpose so that the therapeutic work can be a “sticking with the actual images”
(Hillman, 1985). The name for this manner of working is archetypal psychology
(Hillman, 1985, 1997/2001); it is characterized by the enhancing of imagery and emo-
tion-imbued imagery in particular. What it does not employ is a therapy for pathology.
The imagistic and emotional base of material is inevitably expressed in the style
of narrative. The problematic material becomes the subject of an imaginative and often
literary reﬂection. A poetic basis of mind becomes more relevant than a literal or ob-
jectifying attitude. The narratives are re-told and the versions actively incorporate the
personal failures and suffering but in less of a raw form and in more of a metaphorical
and mythic form. This involves a move from unreﬂected and objective referents to a
more imaginative and aesthetic response.
Finally, therapy ends when a satisfying-enough sense of agency is achieved. If
there is purpose or a goal, then this is it. The ritual of regular visits, face-to-face con-
versations, at a ﬁxed location and for a ﬁxed fee, is deemed to be ﬁnished.
Emergent reflections—methodological
We ﬁrst reﬂect on the process of engaging with the R&D heuristic (see Appendix).
Perhaps the ﬁrst point to be made is that our recent praxis settings have been quite
different. In therapeutic practice the state speciﬁes, sanctions, or condones the need,
and resources, for the therapeutic engagement (i.e., there are particular institutional
arrangements, though they may well be premised on a “false” or limited model of the
therapeutic process). In contrast, in the ﬁeld of multi-stakeholder NRG (natural re-
sources governance) there are few, if any, satisfactory institutional arrangements to
adequately engage with, and transform, situations that might usefully be framed as
wicked; instead in the case of rivers/water, for example, a key domain of NRG, rivers
have been historically framed as hydrological, or geographical, or more recently eco-
logical systems, in other words as a form of biophysical system that excludes people
and the social world. This has led Ison, Collins, and Wallis (2014) to suggest and explore
re-framings of rivers as structurally coupled social-biophysical systems with the social
and biophysical unfolding in a co-evolutionary dance over time. This reframing choice
draws on both Maturana (the structural coupling of two systems) and Krippendorff’s
(1993) dance-ritual metaphor for communication. The need for change is profound
yet all too slow. Consider, for example, how long it is taking to create and agree on a
therapeutic model to meaningfully engage with the biosphere over human-induced
climate change (Ison, 2016). Of course, the presence of conducive institutional arrange-
ments does not guarantee effective or epistemologically aware praxis.
Our use of the heuristic causes us to reﬂect further on the question of what consti-
tutes a critical incident. In one sense there have been no critical incidents of sufﬁcient
profundity to move us away from the trajectory we embarked upon when our collabo-
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ration began 30  years ago. However, the known, when seen with a critical eye, becomes
an invitation to re-frame the event in its context, from which new meaning or a new
issue emerges. In systemic terms this can lead to a boundary shift, and to being open
to new relationships. For example, the model on which the Appendix table is con-
structed was set up within the context of doing co-research; it arose out of a funded
project; but it did not have a conducive governance setting within which it could co-
evolve into an unknowable future. Our understandings were reiﬁed in academic papers
and a book, but we also failed to get any of our practices institutionalized, though per-
haps some of our methods, tools, and techniques were picked up at least in part.8
For RLI, a critical incident was his partial return (professionally) to Australia in
2006 after  12  years in the U.K. and ﬁnding the linear, ﬁrst-order model of R&D stronger
than ever (i.e., deeply entrenched) (Ison & Russell, 2011). We conclude that our current
processes of transforming embodiment (i.e., building new traditions of understanding
through engagement in joint action) are too limited and too weak (at least outside
the therapeutic setting). It is difﬁcult—and rare—to have an opportunity as we did in
1989–1993 to try to enact the whole of the four stages outlined in the Appendix. We
were lucky in the rangelands, but all four stages have not, too our knowledge, been
enacted since.
In the NRG praxis domains there is no obvious answer; the mainstream paradigm
persists in agricultural R&D, in higher education where “content is king,” aided by
new institutional forms such as MOOCs,9 which perpetuate the linear delivery model
of pedagogy at the expense of enabling experiential, embodied learning. The same is
true of public policy, where, in the U.K. at least, “deliverology” has been a primary con-
cern of governments (Seddon, 2008).
A similar struggle between ﬁrst- and second-order understandings of cyber-sys-
temics is apparent within family therapy and the variant in praxis called “systemic
family therapy.” In the ﬁrst-order mode “[cybernetic understandings]  … sought to ex-
amine how various structures might maintain equilibrium through mechanisms such
as knowledge feedback loops, and family therapists adapted these ideas to what they
essentially saw as the self-contained and self-regulating family organism” (Stewart,
2013, reviewing Weinstein, 2013). In contrast, Umberta Telfener (2011), a member of
the Milan School of systemic family therapy, draws on Maturana (1990) to claim the
essence of a second-order praxis is to ﬁrst take responsibility for the awareness of one’s
own participation in the social construction of ideas such as “pathology,” “symptom,”
“problem,” “change,” “intervention,” “participatory research,” “creativity,” “capacity,’’
and “professional.” Arguably systemic family therapy practitioners have been more
successful in institutionalizing a community of praxis than in other domains
(see  Telfener, 2014; Weinstein, 2013). There are lessons in our experience and that of
systemic family therapists for those who seek to build and institutionalize transdisci-
plinary praxis (Ison, 2017) and second-order science (Lissack, 2014).
We have found the critical reﬂection process afﬁrming in the sense that arising
from our joint research are practices and understandings that have proven robust and
resilient, as well as ethical, over time. These include the project management process
of building the research team as systemic action researchers “walking the talk” in their
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doing, which we developed and sustained in our CARR project (CARR, 1993b) and
have adapted in other contexts since (e.g., Blackmore et  al., 2007). Our mode of en-
gaging the pastoral families as co-researchers can be understood as a precursor to now-
established interest in co-research approaches (e.g., Hartley & Bennington, 2000) as
well as increasing interest in co-design practices (Bradwell & Marr, 2008), described
by Powell (2011) as 
a public-service design approach wherein users of services—for example,
public transit or healthcare services—are explicitly involved in formal de-
sign activities. Especially when employed in the design of technologies
for public services, these design approaches can garner beneﬁt from in-
volving a greater number of stakeholders and inspiring more radical serv-
ice design. (p. 110)
Powell in her research in yet another domain also notes the pervasiveness of “assump-
tions of linear progress  … enhanced by organizational structures that separate deci-
sion-making from use, participation from governance,” all concerns that we share
(2011, p.  110).
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, our understanding of enthusiasm (from the Greek
en theos, meaning “the god within”), which we elucidated through our co-research
with pastoralists as an alternative basis for doing R&D to that of “information transfer”
(CARR, 1993a; Russell & Ison, 2000c), has stood the test of time in our own praxis;
trusting the emotion of enthusiasm as the motivational driver of relationship has been
central to our praxis since this time.
Emergent reflections—conceptual
In this section we draw attention to ﬁve reﬂections on relationship creating and main-
taining as part of a praxis dynamic as well as the important role of embodied learning.
Relationships as prima materia
The fundamental constituent of our applied research has consistently been relation-
ship. Adopting the alchemical term prima materia as a metaphorical image for this
fundamental dynamic underscores its critical role. The alchemists believed that they
needed to begin their work by establishing and foregrounding that which was experi-
enced prior to matter. Paradoxically, only the relationships matter.
It is far easier to say “relationship” than to have a listener experience how rela-
tionship functions as a reciprocal unfolding of experience much in the manner of
Krippendorff’s (1993) dance-ritual metaphor for human communication. A feature of
our praxis that we take from our encounters with Humberto Maturana is to open a
talk or lecture with an invitation to consider a phenomenon that has potential to take
a listener out of their commitments to “thingness” and linear causality. Inviting an
audience to consider how walking arises as a practice, following Maturana, works most
effectively. For RLI, only once has an audience participant come back with the expla-
nation that walking arises in the reciprocal relations, or relational dynamics, between
a body (a  person, with a history that is evolutionary, cultural, and social/personal)
and a medium, such as a  ﬂoor, or path. The majority offer explanations that are rooted
in linear causality between things and events. Gregory Bateson also exploited this
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praxis when he asked of audiences why is it that we refer to humans as having four
ﬁngers and a thumb (things) rather than four relationships, between an opposable
thumb and each of the ﬁngers (see N.  Bateson, 2011). In evolutionary terms, it is the
relational dynamics made possible by an opposable thumb that matter. In terms of
communication effectiveness, these examples show the importance of shifting the un-
derlying emotion if one wants to experience a different hearing. 
Relationships, language, and emotion
The common view of language is that its primary function is to facilitate communica-
tion, however the research shows otherwise. Noam Chomsky (2016) in a recent inter-
view argues that the evidence points to communication as being secondary and that
meaning making is what is primary. Language is predominantly an inner languaging
and mostly outside of consciousness. The way a human engages is in relationship with
oneself. Relationship is, in a word, languaging; being in language. An extraordinary
aspect of being in relationship is that there is an autobiographical quality to the expe-
rience. There is an experienced past, present, and anticipated future, all of which con-
stitutes a sense of self, a sense of other, and a sense of bonding: the relationship. Our
use of “languaging” as a concept draws on Maturana, who understands it as an un-
folding circularity in which consensual relations are brought forth and conserved, or
not (e.g., see Proulx, 2008).
The other extraordinary aspect, and one that has long troubled psychologists, is
the question of how is one to account for the phenomenon of incitation to action:
what is referred to, but never adequately explained, as motivational driver, emotion10
or activation. In a recent review of the relevant neuroscience research, Emilio Bizzi
and Robert Ajemian use the metaphor of the puppeteer to summarize their ﬁndings:
“[W]e have some idea as to the intricate design of the puppet and the puppet strings,
but we lack insight into the mind of the puppeteer” (Bizzi & Ajemian, 2015, p.  93). Or
in other words, how is one incited or inclined to do anything?
The centrality of being in relationship is expressed in both authors’ praxis and is
conveyed in poetic form by Antonio Machado’s evocative words: “Wanderer, your foot-
steps are  / the road, and nothing more;  / wanderer, there is no road,  / the road is made
by walking” (Machado, 2007 p. 138). In the clinic the therapeutic encounter for DBR
is expressed as the reciprocal unfolding of experience, the footsteps are the road that
is only recognized on reﬂection. Through the exchange of reﬂective language, in a po-
etic and imaginative sense, the words become ﬂesh (Russell, 2011a).
Narrative as the expression of relationships over time
Avoiding the framing of the “work” as a narrative with a whiff of an objective outcome
has proved to be a constant preoccupation. As has the refusal to allow redemption, an
amelioration, into the narrative-in-action. This commitment to a praxis of “narrative”
as a sequence of recursive processes and nothing more is what makes it both a difﬁcult
philosophy and a source of great strength. The upshot is inevitably a bittersweet expe-
rience (Paschen & Ison, 2014; Russell, 2011b). Along with every attempt to avoid the
seduction of objectivity is the emphasis on a non-literal disposition toward the use of
language. A narrative expression, which is more metaphorical than literal, has encour-
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aged embodied learning and the ongoing development of an embodied imaginative
attitude (Ison, Blackmore, & Iaquinto, 2013; Russell, 2003).
Invitation as manner of entering relationships
Contrary to the notion of “expert” is the one of embodying the experience of engage-
ment: an experience shaped by the desire, the emotion, to be present with another in
a manner of deep respect for each other’s autonomy. As an expression of this deep re-
spect, the emotional move is to offer an invitation to “walk” together. This invitation
seeks neither agreement nor shared understanding. In fact, the attitude of inviting is
characterized by a willingness to have the invitation accepted or not, both being of equal
value. Using the knowing of how we do what we do has been the fundamental starting
point in taking the next step in the unfolding of the ongoing experience. And in doing
so, the path is put in place by the walking i.e., a “design” that is not designed to achieve
a preconceived outcome but a public acknowledgement of the necessary process. 
Conservation of relationships
The clinical relationship (experienced by DBR) is clearly a constructed relationship
based on the negotiated contract of a speciﬁc number of sessions and the agreement
that both parties desire a mutually satisfying experience. The desire and expressed
agreement is to stay present in language and reﬂective conversation. It is Maturana’s
(2016) assertion and one with which we concur that “Living in reﬂective conversations
is our human cultural manner of living together; and living in language in reﬂective
conversation is our particular ecological niche” (p.  214).
Being in therapy is a particular manifestation of an ongoing conversation that is
shaped by the emotion of deeply respecting the other as an independent other, freeing
the two participants from “prejudices, ambitions or expectations [and] is what we call
love in daily life” (Maturana & Poerksen, 2004, p.  117). The overarching commitment
is to stay present in this constructed or realized relationship for the duration of the
agreement. In doing this the necessary conditions for being in this particular sort of
relationship, one shaped by the emotion of “love,” are established and maintained.
No one better than Maturana has articulated the circular epistemology that makes
no reference to some independent domain of existence. The ongoing task is to explain
what we do by doing what we do. Gregory Bateson (1991) referred to the classic paper
“What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain” (Lettvin, Maturana, McCulloch, & Pitts,
1959) to explain how the manner of operation of the nervous system determined the
phenomenon of perception. And, as emphasized by Maturana in all his subsequent
publications, the observer who offered the explanation did not exist prior to their dis-
tinction of themselves as the observer.
Reﬂective listening and reﬂective languaging are based on a form of perception, a
disposition, which allows the other to appear as legitimate. This disposition creates a
space in which the other, the client in therapy, is given a presence to which the thera-
pist can relate to with respect. Of course, therapy is just one example of the creation
of such a space. We have a long way to go in our relations with the biosphere, and one
can see through the lens of a Batesonian epistemology that our preoccupation with
an independent “environment” (as in an “Environment movement,” or a desire to
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save the environment) has been ill-conceived and, possibly, constituted a loss of valu-
able time to rejig our co-evolutionary trajectory.
The fundamental condition of such a space is trust. Trust is the basis of the organ-
ism/environmental niche that is the unit of life; importantly, trust does not exist a priori
(i.e., before the relationship); it is not an “input” into the relationship. Trust is invariably
broken in the natural environment, as it is in all relationships. The recursive dance is
one of trusting/broken trust/re-trusting, with the overarching desire to invite the other
into the domain of legitimacy, the domain of love. This is an ethical reﬂection and an
ongoing responsibility, which when brought into the creation of this dynamic space,
creates the circumstances for further response-ability (i.e., thus creating the reciprocal
circumstances for responsibility). Language offers the space to reﬂect and distinguish
the consequences of our actions for the other(s) with whom we live and work. It is pre-
cisely because of reﬂective language that we can speak of responsibility.
The beauty of offering an invitation to engage in this space, one shaped by the
emotion of deep respect for the other, is that it is not framed in the words of an inter-
vention or even a recommendation. Following Maturana, it is a statement of fact: if
there is no love, there is no social relationship. If there is a relationship informed by
other emotions, such as competition or aggression, there is a very different experience.
One might suffer such an experience but it will not, in any sense, enhance social or
professional or political life.
Embodied learning
While we can only talk about what we are doing (including theorizing as doing), it is
important to distinguish between the domain of living systems (speciﬁcally the body)
and the social/cultural domain that is generated through our conversations, reﬂections,
and theories. Distinguishing the two domains is useful and separating them is impos-
sible. The position of a dual epistemology and a singular ontology is the conclusion of
eminent psychologist Max Valmans (2009) in his work on understanding conscious-
ness. Maturana asserts the biological understanding when he writes: “[T]he biological
processes and the interpersonal relations are different kinds of phenomena and to
confuse them is a conceptual mistake” (Maturana, 2016 p. 213). An epistemological
error is committed because operational and conceptual domains are confused. The
notion of a single ontology asserts that the experiencing body (or, more precisely, the
dynamic ecological organism-niche unity) is the foundation of all life. Yet it is in the
relational space that we do our living even when we are unaware of it, which is for
much of the time. The recursive dynamic of body and space and the ongoing relation-
ship that is constituted by this interaction is then the source of further reﬂection, which
is capable of being interpreted as challenging or wonderful or both. Through our learn-
ing as researchers/authors we want to continuously reﬂect on the conversations that
maintain the “well-being of living together in the intimacy of coordinating the doings
of the daily chores that created (and continue to create) a loving relational space”
(Maturana, 2016, p.  214).
Concluding reflections
The espoused rationale for this special issue was, through “situating at the margins of
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cybernetics,” to revisit and extend the common genealogy of cybernetics and commu-
nication studies. Among the possible topics imagined, two garnered our attention:
1)  the history of intellectual adventurers whose work has appropriated cybernetic con-
cepts; and 2)  the remediation of cybernetic metaphors. We relate very strongly to this
desire to trigger a shift in the co-evolutionary trajectory of cybernetics and communi-
cations studies, but others must judge whether we fulﬁl the role of adventurers and
the extent to which our praxis constitutes remediation. In these ﬁnal reﬂections we
offer a minimum set of “appreciations” that from our experience are essential for a
would-be remediation practitioner understood as a trajectory changer:
1. Neither cybernetics nor communications studies are meaningful unless
grounded in praxis.
2. Praxis based on words and written text, whilst necessary, is inadequate
to trajectory-changing transformation. Maturana understands this even
if his writing leaves the reader, more often than not, frustrated (see
Russell & Ison, 2004). His ambition is to always walk his talk, even in
his writing. Our experience is that time can help (e.g., number of sessions
in therapy) but that use of collaborative diagramming, active exploration
of metaphors, and the like are more reliable (i.e., practices that engage
the body in conversation beyond words).
3. All learning is experiential, and experience arises in the act of making a
distinction in relation to oneself (to one’s history). In other words, ap-
preciating that without distinction (difference) there is no experience
is a key ingredient of institutional and praxis innovation.
4. Humans live with a passion for explanation; what does or does not con-
stitute an explanation is a relational dynamic between explainer and lis-
tener and is mediated by the emotional character of the dynamic.
5. All knowing is doing; this underpins the historical explanation of the
shift from ﬁrst- to second-order cybernetics triggered by questions of
who the controller (explainer, observer) could be taken to be, or as
Heinz von  Foerster is reported to have said, “the cybernetics of cyber-
netics” (see Fell & Russell, 2000).
6. Humans live in language, and it can be helpful to consider that lan-
guage uses us more than we use language (following Maturana); to par-
aphrase the English author Julian Barnes, terms such as “emergence,”
“conversation,” “consciousness,” “self,” and “explanation” are verbs
masquerading as nouns. Because humans live in language it is possible,
through conversation, to reach agreement; hence in an uncertain and
essentially unknowable world, it makes sense to converse about pur-
pose and ethics.
With these six points as background, we conclude by revisiting our ﬁnal research
question as articulated earlier: What does, or could, acting purposefully (innovatively,
designerly, entrepreneurially, ethically, systemically) within a Batesonian epistemology
entail? Perhaps it is too early to answer, because it is what we should not do that is
more readily apparent. This could be understood as a form of reframing, or deframing,
which is much needed.
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For example, it is perhaps Herbert Simon, “among the founding fathers of several
of today’s important scientiﬁc domains, including artiﬁcial intelligence, information
processing, decision-making, problem-solving, organization theory, complex systems,
and computer simulation of scientiﬁc discovery” (Herbert  A. Simon, n.d.), as much
as anyone, who contributed to a distortion of Bateson’s epistemology. In the post–
Second  World War period and across different ﬁelds of scholarship Simon’s under-
standings and language became institutionalized and at odds with Bateson’s
epistemology. This is a co-evolutionary trajectory inadequate to our circumstances.
But how to change such a trajectory? We would highlight as inadequate notions of
goal-directed planning (including objective setting, performance indicators, targets);
the mainstream understanding of information and associated practices under the
rubric of “knowledge, or technology, transfer”; rational planning (blueprints, or as
Donald Schön [1995] called it, the “high ground of technical rationality”); and artiﬁcial
intelligence, to name but a few.
As we have highlighted elsewhere (Fell & Russell, 2000; Ison, 2010), Heinz
von  Foerster’s reﬂective insight about his own praxis as author during the Macy
Conferences in the 1950s is telling (Capra 1996): “[I]t was an unfortunate linguistic
error to use the word ‘information’ instead of ‘signal’ because the misleading idea of
‘information transfer’ has held up progress in this ﬁeld” (Fell & Russell, 2000, p.  34).
If Krippendorff’s (1993) major metaphors of human communication are considered,
only one comes close to how communication happens biologically, viz. “the dance-rit-
ual metaphor.” Avoiding the limitations of this institutionalized semantic mistake has
been central to our praxis in the past 30  years, whether in university teaching and
learning-system design or research and professional praxis (Ison & Russell, 2000;
Russell & Ison, 2004, 2005). A key element, perhaps the key binding element, of this
praxis is to strive to be open to the ﬂow of emotioning (sensu Maturana), or to imagine,
a priori, how in a particular context (anticipated future) the ﬂow of emotioning might
unfold, much as a choreographer imagines an audience in a co-dynamic with a per-
formance (see Russell & Ison, 2004).
Our collaborative journey leaves us constantly aware that one is always immersed
in a tradition of understanding out of which we think and act and which unfolds every
moment of our living. RLI’s experience is that entering into conversations about pur-
pose or design or ethics enhances one’s behavioural repertoire in the unfolding mo-
ment, but only if one is open to the emotions of the moment and not the emotions
reiﬁed in what is seen in the mainstream as the plan, goal, or objective. In this way re-
search praxis in which the researcher is part of the “research system” (i.e., doing sec-
ond-order R&D) is similar to actors, or other performers, who may rehearse and/or
talk through how to interpret and create a role but who, if they are good, are constantly
open to feedback from audience or other actors, but most importantly are open to the
moment of difference, or distinction. In this way purpose is reframed not as a projec-
tion onto a situation, but as an enactment of the recursive dynamics of responsibility
and response-ability.
Acting purposefully within this understanding requires awareness and emotional
literacy associated with an appreciation that the past and anticipated future are merely
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different manners of living in the present. Thus, recovering a history, talking about a
future each trigger different ways of being in the present. The radical nature of
Bateson’s cybernetic epistemology is that any preconceived notion of how a change
should look, any concept of betterment, for example, is a manifestation of a desire for
power over, or control over, how conditions determine experience. When applied to
management of climate change or reduction of psychological symptoms in a thera-
peutic setting, we begin to feel the imperative but no purpose is desirable other than
working to conserve the relational conditions that make possible human living, the
quality of that living, and the relational dynamics that unfold with other humans,
other species, and the Earth itself, along possible trajectories.
Notes
In using the term “cyber-systemics,” we follow a usage coined by the late Gary Boyd, Professor of1.
Education (educational technology) at Concordia University, Montréal. See Boyd, Gary & Zeman,
Vladimir (2007).  
At least within the contemporary theory of metaphor; see Ison et  al. (2015).2.
The Greek verb kυβερνάω (kubernáo) means “to steer,” but in Wiener’s “reinvention” of the term3.
and in post-Wiener discourse, the focus was not on the verb form, but the noun kybernetes, meaning
“helmswoman or steersman.” In Wikipedia, the Englishman Tyndale is attributed with using “gover-
nance” in 1831, so it may be that the term came into common usage in the 1830s in both France and
England (Governance, n.d.).
As we have done earlier, many scholars refer to these lineages as ﬁrst- and second-order cybernetics;4.
but since these are descriptions, or classiﬁcations, of “ﬁelds,” we try to avoid their use in favour of a
language that privileges embodied praxis, although this is not always easy to do.
In the language of the academic ﬁeld these situations are often called “multi-stakeholder situations,”5.
in which it is expected that the stakes of actors will be variously built, but unless actors with multiple
partial perspectives are acknowledged and engaged, little progress in improvement can be made; these
situations are much the same as those framed by Rittel and Webber (1973) as “wicked problems,” or
by Ackoff (1974) as messes, or by Schön (1995) as the swamp of real life issues. 
Within the domains named, we would lay claim to being “intellectual adventurers” (Breton &6.
Proulx, 2006) because our work has attempted to enact and institutionalize (rather than appropriate)
cybernetic concepts and theories in innovative ways.
We use R&D, normally understood as an abbreviation for research and development, as a noun to7.
break away from the linearity implied by thinking R then D.
In some ways our praxis commitments have moved to different levels in a systemic hierarchy—8.
DBL to the therapeutic relationship, primarily a duo, and RLI to the level of governance of human-
biosphere relations.
MOOCs are massive open online courses—for which no obvious business model has emerged, de-9.
spite their recent popularity. For a critique see San José Philosophy Department (2017).
Throughout the text the term “emotion” is used to refer to a motivational driver or source of acti-10.
vation, whereas the term “feeling” is used to refer to a reﬂective evaluation.
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order
processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Stage 1:
Bringing the
system into
existence
(i.e., naming
the system)
with first-
order
processes
Agree on the essen-
tial participants (key
stakeholders); pro-
vide potential partic-
ipants with the
experience of being
listened to; facilitate
the generation of
stories/narrative (to
trigger enthusiasm)
Invite relevant
parties to state
their interest in
a particular
event/experi-
ence
Ability to identify
parties with a par-
ticular stake in an
outcome (e.g., re-
source providers;
users of outcome;
producers of out-
come); capacity to
actively listen and
foster narrative
accounts
To not equally in-
volve stakeholder
groups that histori-
cally have exer-
cised little
influence on how
particular deci-
sions are made
Identifying who
has agency,
and to what
end, in the ther-
apeutic rela-
tionship 
In various research proj-
ects we have explored
and devised ways to pur-
sue a “politics of invita-
tion”— an invitation is
different in its emotional
dynamic to a demand, a
request, or coercion dis-
guised as an invitation
(High, 2002)
There are structural/in-
stitutional constraints to
receiving and accepting
invitations, particularly
in the public sector; our
praxis approaches for
“triggering” enthusiasm
have withstood the test
of time. 
A “system” is gener-
ated that has been
determined by the
main issues of con-
cern to the key
stakeholders.
The system is
determined by
the “problem,”
not the problem
being deter-
mined by the
system.
Group process
skills coupled with
outcome-oriented
skills
That precon-
ceived ideas of
what constitutes
the “problem” will
hinder a reframing
of what consti-
tutes an action-
able problem
Both parties
are required to
work to co-cre-
ate a third do-
main of action,
one biased by
neither of the
two initial posi-
tions.
We have designed and
conducted many suc-
cessful processes, but
all too often key person-
nel depart (i.e., staff
turnover in the public
sector) or we rarely se-
cure active engagement
or even helpful benign
neglect from high-level
managers in agencies,
ministries and the like. 
System-determined
problems dominate in al-
most all contexts; diffi-
cult to create spaces for
the emergence of prob-
lem-determined sys-
tems; John Seddon (see
2008) of Vanguard
Consulting says he will
not accept a job unless
all key senior-level staff
commit to the process
(pers. comm. to RLI,
2014).
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order
processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Collection of suffi-
cient empirical data
so as to establish
the existence of
specified events/ex-
periences
Generation of
patterns of data
over time
Ability to recog-
nize the key cate-
gories of data
required and req-
uisite skills to col-
lect and quantify
data
That easily quan-
tifiable data will
be judged as
being superior to
less easily quan-
tifiable data (e.g.,
value statements;
emotional re-
sponses)
A case history
to be shaped by
data drawn from
emotional, physi-
cal, and aspira-
tional
experiences
(past, present,
anticipated fu-
ture)
This is relatively easy
methodologically but de-
manding in terms of time
and funding. On reflec-
tion we have a tendency
to neglect this step in
our praxis in favour of
enhancing the quality of
the experience for those
participating—perhaps
a trap given the main-
stream preoccupation
with first-order data and
systematic causality.
The setting of therapeu-
tic practice (e.g. institu-
tions and financing) may
create a dynamic that is
not, or is rarely, possible
in public-sector, multi-
stakeholder processes.
Determining the
boundaries of the
system (conceptual,
geographical, etc.) 
To incorporate
data from the
biophysical do-
main and the
psychosocial
domain in de-
termining sys-
tem boundaries
Ability to success-
fully invite partici-
pants to offer
narrative data via
social technolo-
gies (e.g., semi-
structured
interviews, focus
groups)
To favour the gen-
eration of a domi-
nant biophysical
system over a
“human activity
system”
The human spirit
has the ability to
imagine and to
desire so much
yet is capable of
achieving so lit-
tle. The tension
between these
two capacities
constitutes the
core focus for
ongoing thera-
peutic interac-
tion.
In some groups it is diffi-
cult to have the biophysi-
cal domain admitted to
the conversation in any
meaningful way, but with
others the reverse is
true (two cultures), e.g.,
experience of asking
groups to create a con-
ceptual model of a so-
cial-ecological system
and generating many dif-
ferent models from the
same concept.
The concept “system”
has gone feral (Ison,
2016), which has signifi-
cant, often negative
consequences. All uses
of the concept “system”
bring with its use an im-
plicit or explicit bound-
ary judgment— too
infrequently appreci-
ated; there is too little
appreciation of the im-
plications of living in a
language that privileges
nouns.
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Process stage Tasks First / Second-
order processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Stage 2:
Evaluating the ef-
fectiveness of
the system as a
vehicle to elicit
useful 
understanding
(and acceptance)
of the social and
cultural context
Judgments
on ade-
quacy of
data to con-
textual de-
mands
Awareness of how
data were gener-
ated and psycho-
logical and
sociological driv-
ing forces at work
(e.g., operation of
dominant mytholo-
gies; historical un-
derpinnings)
Ability to see differ-
ent worldviews as
expressions of prior
and differing life ex-
perience
“Experts” and oth-
ers with social sta-
tus tending to
impose their con-
ceptual models
and boundaries on
other parties
Client expects
therapist to be
an expert.
Expectation has
to be explored
and demytholo-
gized.
Creating the space
for reflexivity is dif-
ficult—too se-
duced by business
as usual. 
We have made a lot of
progress in designing, or
co-designing, systemic
inquiry processes that
cut through positional
and gendered power dif-
ferentials. We have
processes that, given
sufficient time, can gen-
erate substantial rela-
tional capital from which
trust, concerted action,
changes in understand-
ings, and changes in
practice emerge … but
this process rarely be-
comes institutionalized.
Seek addi-
tional con-
textual data
if neces-
sary
Articulate the
meaning-making
linkage between
first-order and
second-order data,
the latter giving
meaning to the for-
mer
Ability to elicit con-
textual information
and to appreciate
the shaping function
of dominant mytholo-
gies: how meaning
is made by refer-
ence, often outside
of awareness, to or-
ganizing constructs
such as institutional
or cultural “stories”
Desire to establish
a hierarchy of
knowledge
“types”: one kind
of knowledge
being judged as
superior (more
useful) than any
other type
Use of
metaphor/myth
to facilitate a
non-literal atti-
tude to events:
each event hav-
ing a sociologi-
cal and a mythic
character
In Open University
(OU) pedagogy this
has been achieved
by creating the in-
vitation for learn-
ers, as insipient
systems practition-
ers, to take “a de-
sign turn”— see
Ison and
Blackmore (2014).
There is a need to better
appreciate what affor-
dances governance set-
tings and institutional
designs offer for the en-
actment of a Batesonian
epistemology.
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Seek legitimation of
match between an
existing worldview
and the history of
how such a view
was formed
Each individual is
responsible for the
world they “con-
struct,” and each
set of knowledge
is valid for that per-
son precisely be-
cause they have
constructed it.
Ability to
work with a
multiverse
of world-
views
rather than
aspiring for
a common
or universal
view
That the re-
searcher(s) will
subtly try to influ-
ence the proceed-
ings by asserting
a dominant posi-
tion representing
their own point of
view
The culturally
dominant praxis
of pathologizing
disturbing psy-
chological expe-
riences is
expressed as
only a partial
viewpoint.
We have had more suc-
cess in our pedagogical
design than in our re-
search praxis—mature-
age learners at the OU are
in the program because
they choose to be—hence
have a different underlying
emotion to that of many re-
search engagements.
The challenge is to create
the circumstances where
participants stay in the
conversation.
Achieve “two-way”
conversation, or “di-
alogue” in which in-
dividuals speak from
their respective po-
sitions 
Each expression
to be accepted as
a contribution of
value to the even-
tual outcome (an
outcome that is
yet to be named)
To actively
listen and
respect (but
not neces-
sarily
agree) with
others.
Confidence
in present-
ing one’s
position
Some people are
unable to accept
that there may be
different “truths”
representing dif-
ferent worldviews. 
Divergent world-
views can be
held within an
overarching atti-
tude/emotion of
deep respect
(love).
In process designs we en-
gage in “contracting” at
the start and revisit
throughout—we attempt
to frame the contract in
terms of relational phe-
nomena.
Governance failure is per-
vasive in relation to the so-
cial-biophysical realm;
there may be opportunities
to invent institutions that
enable a therapeutic dy-
namic to become the focus
of praxis in this domain.
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Process stage Tasks First / Second-
order
processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Stage 3:
Generation of a
joint decision-
making process
(a problem-deter-
mined system) in-
volving all key
stakeholders
All participants
(stakeholders)
are encour-
aged to fully
address their
concerns and
aspirations
Ambiguity and
uncertainty re-
flect the non-
absolutist
understandings
associated
with every posi-
tion
To reflect back to
the participants
how each position
has an “appropri-
ateness” for a
specified intellec-
tual domain; out-
side of that
domain appropri-
ateness dimin-
ishes rapidly.
Matters which
can be held as
“certain” in one
domain can be
generalized
across other do-
mains.
In therapy, deci-
sion-making is the
ongoing dynamic of
every session. Each
“movement” is a
consequent of dif-
ference being ex-
pressed verbally
and non-verbally.
We live in a culture
where time devoted
to process and the
co-construction of
meaning are under-
valued.
The emergence of
discourses around
co-management, co-
design, co-research,
co-inquiry may open
spaces for praxis in-
novation.
Respective
concerns and
aspirations are
mirrored back
to participants,
showing under-
standing of re-
spective
position
A publicly
sanctioned re-
flexive process
allows for both
confirmation
and public ac-
knowledge-
ment.
Facilitation skills
sufficient to re-
flect what has
been contributed,
and how it has
been said, without
introducing any
new material or al-
tering the emo-
tional milieu
People not recog-
nizing and/or ac-
cepting their own
blind spots
The difference be-
tween talk and re-
flective language,
especially as re-
gards attitudes just
outside of aware-
ness, is empha-
sized.
The skills to do this
in our praxis field
are not well devel-
oped; listening is un-
dervalued and
underappreciated. 
Carefully designed
processes may affect
outcomes that are de-
sired, but participants
may still remain un-
able to respond (i.e.,
have no response-
ability) because of ex-
tant institutional
arrangements.
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
The “problem,”
and thus a de-
sirable out-
come, is
named.
The problem is
within the action
domain of this
group. This group
has “ownership”
of the problem
and of the even-
tual outcome.
Skills of analysis
and synthesis
such that the nom-
inated problem ex-
presses some of
the key needs of
the stakeholders
That the responsi-
bility for acting on
the problem will
be projected to
parties outside of
the task group
The presenting
problem is only oc-
casionally the sole
focus of therapeu-
tic attention.
Creating the circum-
stances for reflexivity
is not easy; our at-
tempts at having
metaphor research
funded have largely
been unsuccessful. 
There are limitations to
the “problem metaphor”
that we now largely avoid
in favour of, e.g., con-
structing “the issue,” or
engaging with “a situa-
tion.”
The decision
(not necessar-
ily agreed with
by all) is made.
The agreement is
that all parties
have been able
to present their
positions in a fair
and full manner.
Acceptance to
proceed is not
contingent on full
agreement on
the final position.
That an intellec-
tual and emotional
climate is
achieved in which
all participants
can see the merits
of differing points
of view and are
able to “let go” of
preferred posi-
tions
That a stakeholder
abandons the de-
cision-making
process rather
than be seen to be
compromising
The decision to
continue therapy is
made on a ses-
sional basis, as is
the decision to
focus on which one
or other of the pri-
mary domains
(emotional, feeling
based, behavioural,
spiritual).
Research from which
this framework was
generated elucidated
how consensus was
a lowest common de-
nominator position
that undermined the
emotional commit-
ment to follow-up ac-
tion except by those
who started with the
consensus position.
In multi-stakeholder situa-
tions, staff turnover and
thus the progress of a
group is often fraught.
Seeking accommodation
of difference is more use-
ful than consensus.
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Stage 4:
Evaluating
the effective-
ness of the
decisions
made (i.e.,
how has the
action taken
been judged
by stakehold-
ers?)
Collective judg-
ments of how
well the gener-
ated problem
represented
key needs of
all stakehold-
ers
This is a measure
of internal effec-
tiveness of the
process and of
subsequent com-
mitment to the 
implementation 
of the decision.
Ability to openly
listen to partici-
pants’ “second
thoughts” without
showing exces-
sive defensive-
ness
Risk of jeopardiz-
ing the 
whole process be-
cause the out-
comes were
judged as being
less than perfect
Not achieving the
co-developed and
shared goals (out-
comes of decisions
made) is character-
istic of psychother-
apy. Evaluation
needs to be both
subtle and overt
and made by both
parties.
Action is not causal in
a linear way and
claims about cause
and effect, and thus
impact or effective-
ness, become politi-
cally and
methodologically
fraught.
Enacting a
Batesonian epistemol-
ogy requires more at-
tention to discourse
development in what
is now understood as
efficacy and effective-
ness in a given situa-
tion.
Assessment of
increased
readiness to
address, in a
similar manner,
other needs
and concerns
A second-order
system coupled
with a first-order
system facilitates
learning-to-learn
by the partici-
pants and, in-
creasingly, is
embedded in the
culture of the or-
ganizations.
Ability to demon-
strate the second-
order outcomes
and to present
them as reusable
building blocks
A tendency to dis-
parage second-
order outcomes
vis-à-vis first-
order ones
Moving from a pre-
senting problem
focus to a more dis-
positional one (How
might I position my-
self in the flow of
daily living?).
Our innovations
around “systemic in-
quiry” as an alterna-
tive process and
institution to that of
the project shows
considerable promise
(see Ison, Carberry,
Davies, Hall,
McMillan, Maru,
et al., 2014).
How to institutionalize
new institutions and
“dispose” of ones not
fit for purpose is a
new challenge.
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Process
stage
Tasks First / Second-
order processes
Skills Potential 
pitfalls
Critical 
reflection / 
incidents DBR
Critical reflection / 
incidents RLI
Contemporary 
implications
Estimate how
transparent
(open to public
scrutiny) the
decision-mak-
ing process
has been
A transparent
process allows
participants to ac-
cept a decision
(because the
process has been
experienced as
being fair and equi-
table) even when
they do not fully
agree with it.
Ability to bal-
ance those who
bring with them
institutional
and/or social
“power” with
those tradition-
ally less en-
dowed
That a climate of
mutual accept-
ance cannot be
achieved: where
differential
“power” has not
been accepted
“Power” is under-
stood as a whole
system of ideas
that works to main-
tain our current so-
ciety. It is a belief
system that is
closely aligned with
religion and ideas
of progress.
The challenge is to
find, and enact, lever-
age points against a
field of power, e.g.,
systemic inquiry;
agency to frame and
re-frame situations;
exploring institutional
affordances; engag-
ing in systemic design
and/or evaluation.
Co-production of an
evaluative narrative is
not resourced and val-
ued.
Evaluate the
ease of imple-
mentation
of the deci-
sions made
Organizations tend
to conserve their
status quo, espe-
cially the desire to
maintain the pat-
terning of key rela-
tionships.
Skills to articu-
late the struc-
tural variables,
both constraints
and enabling
factors, that in-
fluence imple-
mentation
An organization
might find it prefer-
able to shift the
entire debate to a
totally different
arena rather than
implement an “up-
setting” decision.
Converting a desire
to change (attitude,
behaviour) into part
of daily praxis only
happens slowly and
with practice.
This requires continu-
ity—a rare thing in
multi-stakeholder situ-
ations.
Reframe governance as
the choreography of ef-
fective “problem-deter-
mined system”
performances?
Note: This heuristic was developed over a 25-year period. It is based on an adaptation of a design for enacting an R&D system comprising
ﬁrst- and second-order processes (understood as a totality or duality, not a dualism); DBR: David Russell; RLI: Ray Ison. Source: Adapted
from Russell & Ison, 2000b. 
